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interlocutor with full human agency and dignity; (8) regrets his action or 
inaction “categorically,” that is, not merely as a bad consequence of an 
appropriate action (“I am sorry that I dropped an atomic bomb on your 
country but it was the best available option”), but as an action that he 
now thoroughly repudiates; (9) articulates (communicates) 1–2, 4–8 to the 
victim; 10) reforms his life so as not to offend again in the way apologized 
for, again and again demonstrates his commitment to reform, accepts ap-
propriate sanctions for his wrongdoing, and redresses the injury as far as 
he reasonably can; (11) intends his apology to serve not merely his own 
interests, but the wellbeing of the victim and the vindication of relevant 
values; (12) feels appropriate emotions, for example, guilt about his delin-
quency and sympathy for the victim.
Much of the burden of Smith’s book is to show how far many (most) 
apologies fall short of being real apologies, by apologizing vaguely or 
about the wrong wrong, by not really taking responsibility, by express-
ing only sympathy or conditional regret, by only expressing agreement 
on the moral principles involved, or by not really intending to act differ-
ently in the future. Apologies are often deceitful, being efforts to convey 
“meaning” they do not actually have so as to avoid responsibility or the 
consequences of irresponsible behavior. Smith’s book aims to make this 
eventuality less likely in the reader’s case. Among non-categorical kinds 
of apologies, Smith discusses the Ambiguous Apology, Expression of 
Sympathy, the Value-Declaring Apology, the Conciliatory Apology, the 
Compensatory Apology, the Purely Instrumental Apology, the Coerced 
Apology, and the Proxy Apology.
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tinuum, 2008. Pp. 155. $130.00 (hardcover).
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The problem of free will is one of those philosophical problems—perhaps 
they are all like this—that rewards those who take the time to revisit the 
basics. It is for this reason that I am always glad to see books like Kevin 
Timpe’s Free Will: Sourcehood and Its Alternatives, which for the most part en-
deavors to furnish the last fifty years of debate over free will with a new and 
useful perspective. Timpe thus adds his own voice to the mix not only by ar-
guing for a particular view about free will but also by simply telling its story.
Timpe’s book is very readable and he displays an impressive command 
of what has become an almost unmanageably large literature. Indeed, 
Timpe tells his story so that, for the most part, readers need not have any 
background in free will (though I would wager that newcomers to the is-
sues will nevertheless occasionally get lost in the intricate thicket that the 
Frankfurt-style counterexamples have become). The book’s conclusion is 
240 Faith and Philosophy
incompatibilist but theorists of all stripes will find much to like in Timpe’s 
treatment even when they disagree with his ultimate conclusions.
Timpe’s book is structured by a distinction between two dominant con-
ceptions of free will. According to the first, “free will is primarily a func-
tion of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does,” whereas accord-
ing to the second, “free will is primarily a function of an agent being the 
ultimate source of her actions” (p. 10). After introducing this distinction 
and other relevant jargon in chapter 1, Timpe spends roughly equal time 
exploring each conception.
In chapter 2, Timpe points out that the first conception of free will 
plays a crucial role in one influential argument for incompatibilism, The 
Basic Argument: “(1) Free will requires the ability to do otherwise. (2) If 
causal determinism is true, then no agent has the ability to do otherwise. 
(3) Therefore, free will requires the falsity of causal determinism” (p. 21). 
Incompatibilism is the conclusion, but there are two ways to resist: ac-
cept strong compatibilism, the view that determinism is consistent with the 
ability to do otherwise (p. 23), or accept weak compatibilism, the view that 
the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for free will after all (p. 30). 
After rejecting various versions of strong compatibilism, Timpe focuses 
on Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs), which constitute one salient 
way of challenging premise (1).
Roughly, an FSC is a story about someone who performs a morally 
reprehensible act for his own reasons but who is being monitored by an 
observer who is prepared to intervene if the protagonist were about to 
have an attack of conscience. Since the observer is ready but does not need 
to intervene, the wrongdoer allegedly acts of his own free will despite be-
ing unable to do otherwise. If such cases are coherent, free will does not 
require the ability to do otherwise after all. Timpe dedicates chapters 3 
and 4 to the most recent rejoinders to FSCs.
The first is the Dilemma Defense, according to which FSCs founder on 
whether determinism is true in the examples. If it is, then the examples 
beg the question, since the incompatibilist will not have the intuition that 
the wrongdoer is acting of his own free will. If determinism is false, how-
ever, then the wrongdoer seems to retain the ability to do otherwise. Ei-
ther way, there is a problem (p. 34).
Timpe inserts his own voice into the story at this point by offering his 
favored response, which is to redescribe the examples so that they employ 
trumping preemption rather than the traditional cutting preemption (pp. 
44–47). Traditional descriptions of FSCs employ a prior sign that indicates 
whether the observer needs to intervene and preempt (by cutting off) the 
would-be wrongdoer’s attack of conscience, and it is the prior sign that 
gives rise to the problematic dilemma in the first place. In Timpe’s view, 
if we shift to a case that involves two complete causal chains one of which 
trumps the other (though little is said about how), then we can avoid prior 
signs altogether and hence sidestep the Dilemma Defense. Timpe’s view 
here, despite its complexity, is interesting and worthy of consideration.
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The second incompatibilist rejoinder to FSCs is the Flicker of Freedom 
strategy, of which there are two versions. Both strategies begin by noting 
that the only way to rid FSCs of all alternative possibilities is to assume 
determinism, which would be dialectically unfair. So, some alternatives 
will always be present in non-question-begging FSCs. Here the strategies 
diverge over which leftover alternatives count as morally relevant and thus 
capable of refuting (1) of the Basic Argument.
The Weak flicker strategy is satisfied with any old alternative since, 
as Timpe says, “If the falsity of determinism is relevant to free will . . . 
then any alternative possibilities are also morally relevant in that they are 
a necessary presupposition for the agent’s being free” (pp. 55–56). The 
Strong flicker strategy, on the other hand, argues that alternatives can be 
found that are morally relevant in the stronger sense of helping to explain 
the agent’s free will (p. 60). Timpe argues that although the Weak strategy 
succeeds, it is dialectically inert since compatibilists will reasonably insist 
on a stronger sense of “morally relevant.” On the other hand, although the 
Strong strategy would be dialectically forceful, Timpe argues against one 
particularly salient version of it (though he attempts a novel—but, in my 
view, unsuccessful—defense of the Strong strategy in chapter 7).
The second part of the book begins with chapter 5, in which Timpe 
motivates the turn to sourcehood (alternative possibilities do not “get at 
the heart of the matter” (p. 72) since not all will help to ground free will) 
and presents two influential compatibilist accounts of it. I especially ap-
preciate this chapter of the book because it makes clear that sourcehood 
is not an idea exclusively owned by incompatibilists, a point that often 
seems overlooked. Timpe finds compatibilist accounts of sourcehood un-
tenable, however, for the familiar reason that they are subject to counter-
examples involving external manipulation. Unfortunately, there is little 
more to Timpe’s argument against compatibilist accounts of sourcehood 
than mere intuition clash. For instance, of the fact that Frankfurt must al-
low for the possibility of externally implanted sourcehood, Timpe says, 
“I think the size of this particular bullet gives us sufficient reason to look 
elsewhere for a satisfactory account of sourcehood” (p. 78). We all must 
choose which bullets to bite, of course, but Frankfurt must think this one 
is particularly tasty, and it would have been interesting to see Timpe try a 
bit harder to understand the compatibilist’s taste buds.
In chapter 6, Timpe goes a bit further by presenting and defend-
ing Derk Pereboom’s 4-case argument against compatibilist accounts of 
sourcehood and then defends incompatibilist accounts from two press-
ing objections, including the notorious Luck Objection. His presentation 
of the 4-case argument—according to which there is no relevant differ-
ence between responsibility-undermining manipulation and ordinary 
deterministic causation—is in my view one of the best parts of the book 
because he tells a compelling story of the motivations that generate the ar-
gument in the first place. His response to the Luck Objection, however, is 
underwhelming. According to the Luck Objection, “the failure of a choice, 
242 Faith and Philosophy
volition, action, etc. to be determined by previous events and/or states [as 
the incompatibilist requires] means that the resulting choice, volition, ac-
tion is somehow inexplicable or random or merely the result of luck” (p. 
96). Timpe gives two responses: (1) not all indeterminism undermines free 
will, and (2) most compatibilists have a problem about luck, too. Although 
both points are correct, neither puts the Luck Objection to rest. At best, 
they show that (1) the proponent of the Luck Objection needs to be very 
specific about the sort of indeterminism that is thought problematic and 
(2) if the incompatibilist is in hot water, she is in good company.
In the final chapter Timpe turns to a discussion of two varieties of 
Source Incompatibilism. Those well-versed in the issues will recognize in 
the book’s title a clever pun that reveals Timpe’s own position, which is 
Wide Source Incompatibilism, according to which the appropriate con-
ception of sourcehood is incompatibilist and entails an alternative pos-
sibilities condition as well. According to Narrow Source Incompatibilism, 
on the other hand, no alternative possibilities condition is needed. Timpe 
argues at length against Eleonore Stump’s Narrow view and concludes 
quite generally that any incompatibilist is committed to an alternative 
possibilities condition (thus eliminating the need for Narrow Source In-
compatibilism in a proper taxonomy, I suppose). His critique of Stump is 
nuanced and provocative, but I worry about the general conclusion and 
the taxonomy it generates.
The argument seems to run as follows: (1) All incompatibilists insist 
on indeterminacy at some point in the causal history of an action. (2) All 
indeterminacy entails alternative possibilities of some sort. So, (3) All in-
compatibilists must insist on alternative possibilities of some sort. Timpe 
says that these alternatives are “a verifying or indicating condition for the 
satisfaction of the sourcehood condition” (p. 114). Thus all source incom-
patibilists ought to be Wide Source Incompatibilists. This argument is fine 
as far as it goes, but what worries me is that it doesn’t go all that far. I have 
a similar worry about the Weak Flicker Strategy: part of what is at issue 
is which alternative possibilities are morally relevant (and, indeed, what 
the relevant sense of “morally relevant” is) and thus it is an open ques-
tion whether the alternative possibilities that all incompatibilists must 
insist upon are robust enough to underwrite a proper alternative possi-
bilities condition on free will. Accordingly, the more interesting distinc-
tion would be between those incompatibilists who think there is some 
robust alternative possibilities condition and those who don’t, rather than, 
as Timpe has it, between those who accept some “very ‘weak’ or ‘flimsy’” 
(p. 114) alternative possibilities condition and those who don’t (which, 
as Timpe convincingly argues, doesn’t actually distinguish between any 
actual theorists).
In chapter 1, Timpe sets for himself three main goals: first, “to provide 
a fair and clear introduction to many of the central issues in contemporary 
debates about free will” (p. 4); second, to “elaborate and clarify” the basic 
idea that “what is most important for an agent’s free will is the agent being 
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the source of her actions in a certain way” (p. 12); and third, to develop an 
argument “that agents have free will only if they are the sources of their 
choices in a certain way, and being the source of one’s actions in this way 
requires the falsity of causal determinism” (p. 16). Despite the worries out-
lined above, I think it is clear that Timpe fulfills all three of his goals, and 
that’s an impressive accomplishment for a mere 121 pages of text. I com-
mend his book to you.
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J. P. Moreland’s The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (hereafter, Imago Dei) is a sus-
tained critique of naturalistic views of the human person. Moreland ar-
gues that naturalism fails to explain (or provides inferior explanations for) 
consciousness, free will, rationality, the self, and moral value; theism of-
fers a better explanation in every case. Given the number and complexity 
of the arguments in Imago Dei, the summary which follows is inevitably 
highly selective.
Why does naturalism provide an inferior explanation of consciousness? First, 
those naturalists who deny property dualism run up against strong argu-
ments, since mental states plausibly have a number of features that physi-
cal states lack, including: (1) being directed toward an object, (2) being pri-
vate, (3) being non-spatial (i.e., neither extended in nor located in space), 
and (4) having a felt-quality (e.g., what it feels like to be in pain). Second, 
those naturalists who accept property dualism have difficulty providing 
adequate explanations of mental states for such reasons as:
1. The “regular correlation between types of mental states and physi-
cal states seems radically contingent” (p. 25). Why is pain (rather 
than a feeling of joy) correlated with C-fiber firing? And how can 
naturalists explain the apparent possibility of “zombie” worlds and 
of “inverted qualia” worlds?
2. Given that naturalists accept the causal closure of the physical do-
main, and given the irreducibility of mental states, naturalists must 
accept epiphenomenalism; but epiphenomenalism is surely false 
since mental causation seems undeniable.
3. Evolutionary explanations of the mental don’t work because “the 
functions organisms carry out consciously could just as well have been 
done unconsciously.” And “it is the output [bodily movement], not 
what caused it, that bears on the struggle for reproductive advan-
tage” (p. 26).
